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21 Introduction
The digital economy is powered by the parsing of large amounts of data. This allows compa-
nies to hone, target, and rene their product oerings to individual consumers. For example,
search engines rely on data from successive searches an individual makes to both personalize
the search results that the individual sees, and to rene their search algorithm for other
users. This new data economy has obvious benets for both rms and individuals, but it
raises privacy concerns. Never before have rms been able to observe consumer actions on
such a detailed level or obtain such potentially personal information. This generates the
possibility of an inherent tension between innovations that rely on the use of data, and the
protection of consumer privacy.
The existence of this tension remains a subject of debate in policy discussions. For
example, recent comments submitted to the Federal Trade Commission by `The Center for
Digital Democracy', a major privacy advocacy group, criticize those who `cling to a imsy
argument that the economic health of the Internet will be jeopardized if the FTC imposes
reasonable consumer privacy safeguards.'1 In this chapter, we draw on the existing empirical
literature to examine whether and when there is a tradeo between innovation and privacy.
The potential for a tradeo between innovation and privacy spans many industries. In
online advertising, advertising networks collect large amounts of clickstream data about
individual users. They then use this information to select which ads to display to individual
users as they browse the internet. This makes ads more relevant and informative to the
user, but also raises privacy concerns. For example, if a user browses credit consolidation
websites, they might subsequently be served ads about bankruptcy services. Those ads
would certainly be relevant, but the user never gave permission for their potentially private
1File No. P095416: Comments on `Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change A Proposed
Framework for Businesses and Policymakers,' The Center for Digital Democracy and U.S. PIRG (US Public
Interest Research Groups)
3nancial information to be collected. Users have no readily accessible way of preventing its
collection, and they have no guarantees it will not be shared with entities, such as credit
providers, that could use it in ways that harm the user.
In the health sector, innovations in digitizing health information lead to quality improve-
ments, because innovations make patient information easy to access and to share. However,
easy access and portability raise privacy concerns because consumers want sensitive data to
be seen only by pertinent healthcare providers.
These instances of data collection and processing have led to calls for legal safeguards for
consumer privacy in the non-government sector. This is a break from the past, when public
and legal discussions focused on government collection and use of data for surveillance, crime
prevention, and crime detection, from the US Constitution's Fourth Amendment to Orwell's
Big Brother to the debate surrounding the US Patriot Act. For non-governmental entities,
legal discourse has historically focused on instances where rms intruded on privacy by
publicizing personal and potentially private information about public gures. This reected
the fact that collecting detailed personal data was so costly and dicult that it was only
people who enjoyed some form of celebrity who were vulnerable to privacy intrusion from
non-governmental entities.
Recent advances in information and communication technology have made data collection
so scalable that anybody's data can be collected and used for commercial gain. In other
words, the costs of data collection and storage have fallen to a point where almost everyone is
of sucient commercial interest to warrant some electronic tracking. Attention has therefore
turned to rms' intrusions into individuals' private aairs. Solove (2008) notes that cases
involving privacy are increasingly common in the US court system. In turn, legal scholarship
and policy attention has turned to the issue of regulating more generally the circumstances
under which rms can (and do) collect potentially intrusive data. For example, in the EU, the
E-privacy directive (2002/58/EC) oered protection to consumers regarding the collection
4of telecommunications and internet data. Similarly, the 1996 Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act in the United States oered patients some privacy guarantees and
access to their medical data.
This chapter argues that the presence and content of such regulations directly inuence
the direction and rate of innovation. Importantly, there is substantial variation across across
industries and contexts in the costs and benets of privacy. We base these arguments on
the existing empirical literature. This literature has focused on the advertising-supported
internet and on healthcare, so much of the discussion in this chapter focuses on these in-
dustries. Taken together, this literature suggests that privacy policy is inter-linked with
innovation policy and should be treated that way by government authorities. In particular,
the tradeo is no longer only between collecting data to prevent crime and avoiding intrusive
government surveillance or balancing the right of a public gure to a private life, but also
between data-based innovation and protecting consumer privacy.
In section 2, we discuss how rms collect and use data in potentially privacy-intrusive
ways. This is followed by a discussion of how this use of data is being regulated and the
consequences of this regulation in section 3. We then discuss some implications for compet-
itive structure and conclude with a summary and some speculation on the implications for
policy going forward.
2 How rms are using personal data
In this section, we discuss how companies are using data in three sectors where the trade-
os between data-based innovation and privacy are particularly acute: online advertising,
health care, and operations. These sectors provide a representative, though not exhaustive,
overview of the ways in which digitization is changing the way that information is gathered
and used. Each of these examples shows how the collection and analysis of data can drive
innovation.
52.1 Use of data in online advertising
Online advertising is perhaps the most familiar example of how rms use the rich data
provided by the use of information and communication technology. Online advertising is
also distinctive among advertising media in its application of detailed data collection. Key
to this data collection eort are two important dierences between online advertising and
oine advertising - `Targetability' and `Measurability'. Targetability reects the collection
and use of data to determine which kind of customers would be most likely to be inuenced by
a particular ad. Measurability reects the collection and use of data to evaluate whether or
not their advertising has actually succeeded (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011a). Targetability and
measurability have helped make advertising-supported internet companies, such as Google
and Facebook, among the fastest-growing and most innovative in the US economy.
Ad targeting occurs when an advertiser chooses to show an ad to a particular subset
of potential viewers of the ad, and displays the ad online to that subset rather than to
everyone using the media platform. An example would be choosing to advertise cars to people
who have recently browsed webpages devoted to car reviews and ratings. No newspaper or
television station can oer this level of targeting. The targetability of online advertising
can be thought of as reducing the search costs for advertisers of identifying consumers.
Targeting advertising has always been known to be desirable, but internet advertising has
two primary advantages over oine advertising. First, the online setting makes it virtually
costless for advertisers to collect large amounts of customer data. Second, internet technology
makes it relatively easy to serve dierent customers dierent ads because packets are sent to
individual computers. In contrast, with current technology, targeting individual customers
with newspaper or TV ads is prohibitively expensive.
These innovative targeting methods require media platforms to collect comprehensive
data on the webpages that customers have previously browsed. Typically, advertisers and
6website owners track and identify users using a combination of cookies, ash cookies, and
web-bugs. Many advertising networks have relationships with multiple websites that allow
them to use these technologies to track users across websites and over time. By examining
past surng and click behavior, rms can learn about current needs as well as general pref-
erences. Reecting the value of this behavioral targeting to rms, Beales (2010) documents
that in 2009 the price of behaviorally targeted advertising was 2.68 times the price of un-
targeted advertising. Lambrecht and Tucker (2011) further show that the performance of
behavioral targeting can be improved when combined with clickstream data that helps to
identify the consumer's degree of product search.
In addition to targeting, online advertisers collect and analyze data to measure ad ef-
fectiveness. This works for two reasons. First, the online platform makes it possible for a
company to link a consumer's viewing of an advertisement to the consumer's later behavior
including purchases, browsing, and survey responses. Second, the online platform facilitates
eld experiments in which companies randomly show dierent consumers dierent webpages.
These experiments are called `a/b tests' in the industry. Combined, these two techniques
mean that online advertisers can easily perform experiments that randomly expose only some
customers to an ad, and then use clickstream data to compare later behavior between those
who see the ad and those who didn't, enabling a causal measure of advertising eectiveness.
For example, Reiley and Lewis (2009) use data that links randomized ad exposure to oine
purchase behavior to examine the impact of a particular online ad campaign. In this case,
the advertising data was collected as part of the regular business processes of the online
advertising market.
Broadly, therefore , the online setting has led to large improvements in the targeting and
measurement technologies available to the advertising industry.
72.2 Use of data in healthcare
The 2009 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act,
part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), devoted $19.2 billion to
increase the use of Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) by healthcare providers. Underlying
this substantial public subsidy is a belief that creating an electronic rather than a paper in-
terface between patient information and healthcare providers can improve healthcare quality,
facilitate the adoption of new technologies, and also save money.
EMRs are the backbone software system that allows healthcare providers to store and
exchange patient health information electronically. As EMRs diuse to more medical prac-
tices, they are expected to reduce medical costs and improve patient care. For example, they
may reduce medical costs by reducing clerical duplication; however, there are no universally
accepted estimates concerning how much money EMRs will save. Hillestad et al. (2005)
suggest that EMRs could reduce America's annual healthcare bill by $34 billion through
higher eciency and safety, based on a 15-year period and 90% EMR adoption.
In contrast, the clinical benets from EMR systems have been demonstrated in recent
empirical work (Miller and Tucker, 2011a).2 This research examines eects of the digitization
of healthcare on neo-natal outcomes over a 12-year period. This is a health outcome that is
a commonly-used measure for assessing the quality of a nation's healthcare system, and is
important in its own right. As we discuss in depth later, Miller and Tucker (2011a) is also
directly relevant to the current chapter, as it measures the relationship between healthcare
outcomes, hospital IT adoption, and state-level privacy regulation.
Miller and Tucker (2011a) nd that a 10 percent increase in basic Electronic Medical
2There are several papers in the healthcare policy literature that attempt to quantify how the digitization
of patient data has aected health outcomes. These studies have found it dicult to document precise eects,
partly because they relied on data that was limited either by a short time or limited geographical coverage.
Studies that document the adoption decision of individual hospitals or hospital systems provide suggestive
evidence that IT may improve clinical outcomes (Kuperman and Gibson, 2003; Garg et al., 2005; Chaudhry
et al., 2006), but there are also examples of unsuccessful implementations (Ash et al., 2007). Agha (2010),
however, found no precise eect from healthcare IT on costs for Medicare inpatients.
8Records adoption would reduce neonatal mortality rates by 16 deaths per 100,000 live births.
This is roughly three percent of the annual mean (of 521) across counties. Furthermore, they
nd that a 10 percent increase in hospitals that adopt both EMRs and obstetric-specic
computing technology reduces neonatal mortality by 40 deaths per 100,000 live births. This
suggests there are increasing gains from the digitization of healthcare. The paper shows
that the reduction in deaths is driven by a decrease in deaths from conditions that can be
treated with careful monitoring and data on patient histories. There is no such decrease for
conditions where prior patient data is not helpful from a diagnostic standpoint.
Overall, Miller and Tucker (2011a) document that the use of patient data by hospitals
helps to improve monitoring and the accuracy of patient medical histories. More broadly,
even basic EMR systems can improve the quality of data repositories and ease of access to
relevant patient information. Adoption of technologies that facilitate data collection and
analysis can help make hospitals improve outcomes and perhaps reduce costs.
2.3 Use of data to improve operations
In the past, when a customer interacted with a rm oine, the trail of information was
scattered and limited. There may have been point-of-sale records, telephone records, and
in some cases scanner data from the checkout if the rm oered a customer loyalty card.
However, in general it was hard for any rm to link behavior to an individual at much more
than a county or zipcode level.
However, the online picture is very dierent. From the rst moment a customer visits a
website, the rm can cheaply collect and store many types of information:
 The website that directed the user to that website, and if the user used a search engine,
what search terms they used to reach the website.
 What part of an individual webpage is displayed on the screen.
 The decisions that a user made (such as making an actual purchase) and also decisions
9that the user did not make (such as the decision to abandon a purchase).
This kind of information is collected using individual behavior at a specic website.
However, if the website has agreements with other websites to share users' clickstreams, the
reach of this information is potentially much broader. Two particular areas of note are:
 If the rm has an agreement with a social networking site such as Facebook, it can
use any information that the user chooses to make public in their settings (often their
name, friends, and aliations) to personalize that person's web experience.
 More broadly, the rm can try to match its click-stream information with other websites
to track what other websites that person visited. This is often facilitated by the type
of advertising networks discussed earlier.
It is not new for companies to collect information about their customers. For decades,
rms have been able to buy data from external parties (such as magazine subscription and
car ownership data) and integrate it into their mailing lists. What is new about the collection
of online data is the scope of the data collected, the precision with which the company can
associated an action with a specic customer, and the sheer quantity of information. Prior to
online purchasing, stores rarely observed abandoned shopping carts, statements of customer
preferences, or a complete list of all past purchases.
This means that there are benets to rms that oer services online from the retention
and use of customer clickstream data beyond the example of advertising described earlier.
One common innovative application is the use of data to tailor products automatically to a
consumers' needs and interests. Data can also be used for immediate feedback. For exam-
ple, Google retains user clickstream data in order to continuously improve both its search
algorithms and online product services such as youtube.com, based partly on terminated
user queries and actions.
10Online data has also allowed the development of recommender systems. Recommender
systems use customers' purchase decisions to oer recommendations about products of inter-
est to another customer. For example, if a website observes a customer buying a DVD of the
TV series `Lost', they use the purchase histories of other customers who have also bought
Lost to suggest other DVDs that the customer might also enjoy. Dias et al. (2008) suggests
that such systems can increase revenues by 0.3 percent. This is economically signicant
given the relatively low cost of implementing such systems and the high costs of increasing
revenues through alternative marketing actions. Recommender systems can also be designed
to move sales toward higher-margin items (Fleder and Hosanagar, 2009).
So far, the focus of discussion has largely been on how the sharing of online information
has been used by rms to improve the accuracy of their eorts to increase demand and
improve customer satisfaction. However, improvements in ICT allow a wide-scale collection
of consumer data that can also enhance a rm's operational eciency. At Walt Disney
World, a new operations center is designed to use detailed customer surveillance data to
minimize wait times in lines (Barnes, 2010). Many nancial services companies use data to
predict credit risk to determine promotions and interest rate oers.
Another valuable type of data for operational eciency is information on consumer trends
that enables rms to manage their supply chains more eectively. For example, companies
use data on online wishlists, online grocery lists, and registries to project future demand for
certain products. Search data is also useful for predicting demand. For example, Choi and
Varian (2009) show that data about who is searching for what on search engines can predict
travel and retail demand reasonably accurately.
Again, the collection and analysis of information, facilitated by recent advances in infor-
mation and communications technologies, has led to innovation in the operations of rms
from online retailers to theme parks to nancial services companies.
113 Privacy Regulation and its Consequences for Innovation and
Economic Outcomes
This large-scale-data collection has raised privacy concerns and has also in some instances
led to specic regulation. In this section, we describe several privacy regulations and their
consequences on online advertising, healthcare, and operations.
Before we do so it is important to point out that, prior to the arrival of digitization and
the associated ability to collect and analyze large amounts of individual-specic information,
US law did not focus on the collection of individual-level data by companies. Specically,
Prosser (1960) identied four distinct torts that are subsumed into the general concept of
`privacy' (Austin, 2006; Solove, 2008):
1. Intrusion upon the plainti's seclusion or solitude, or into his private aairs (in short,
`upon seclusion')
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plainti (in short, `publication
of private facts')
3. Publicity which places the plainti in a false light in the public eye (in short, `false
light publicity')
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plainti's name or likeness (in
short `misappropriation of name or likeness').
Much legal scholarship and legislation from 1960 to 1989 focused on the latter three torts,
as well as on government use of data. The focus was on instances where rms or individuals
intruded on privacy by taking personal information and making it public. Generally, these
cases focused on famous or infamous public gures and on determining the legal boundaries
between private and public life. As such, this focus reected the old reality that collecting
12detailed personal data was so labor-intensive that it was only people who enjoyed some
form of celebrity who were vulnerable to privacy intrusion from non-governmental entities.
Digitization has changed the costs of collecting and analyzing individual-level data and the
regulations discussed in this section are responses to these emerging digital technologies.
3.1 Online Advertising
3.1.1 Regulation
Industry groups have argued that collecting advertising data online is harmless because
it typically involves a series of actions linked by an IP address or otherwise anonymous
cookie-ID numbers. However, attempts by advertisers to use this information has met with
resistance from consumers due to a variety of privacy concerns. Turow et al. (2009) found that
66 percent of Americans do not want marketers to tailor advertisements to their interests.
Fear that users may react unfavorably because of privacy concerns has led advertisers to
limit their targeting of ads. A survey suggested that concerns about consumer response have
led advertisers to reduce the targeting of advertising based on online behavior by 75 percent
(Lohr, 2010).
These concerns over the use of data for targeted advertising have also led to a number of
regulations designed to oer privacy protection. The rst major legislation which addressed
this issue was the European `E-Privacy Directive', EC/2002/58. This legislation was pre-
dominantly targeted at the telecommunications sector. However, several provisions of the
E-Privacy Directive limited the ability of companies to track user behavior on the internet.
These changes made it more dicult for a specic advertiser to collect and use data about
consumer browsing behavior on other websites.
The interpretation of EC/2002/58 has been somewhat controversial as it relates to be-
havioral targeting. For example, it is not clear the extent to which companies need to obtain
opt-in consent: the provision says only that companies who use invisible tracking devices
13such as web-bugs require the `knowledge' of consumers, and the denition of `knowledge' has
been extensively debated. This is one of the reasons why, in the recent `Telecoms Reform
Package,' the EU amended the current regulation to clarify which practices are allowed.
However, in general the limitations that the current EU regulation imposes on data collec-
tion by online advertisers are widely seen as stricter than those in the United States and
elsewhere. For example, Baumer et al. (2004) (p. 410) emphasize that the privacy laws that
resulted from the E-Privacy Directive are far stricter than in the US and that `maintaining
full compliance with restrictive privacy laws can be costly, particularly since that adherence
can result in a loss of valuable marketing data.'
There are also proposals for legislation in the US. FTC (2010) in particular suggested that
the US should move to implement a `Do Not Track' policy that would allow consumers to
enable persistent settings on their web browsers preventing rms from collecting clickstream
data. USDOC (2010) suggested adding a specic privacy oce within the Department of
Commerce to monitor and regulate the use of data by rms.
3.1.2 Consequences
However, such regulation will impose costs. As set out by Evans (2009) and Lenard and
Rubin (2009), there is a tradeo between the use of online customer data and the eectiveness
of advertising.
In order to calibrate these costs, in Goldfarb and Tucker (2011c) we examined responses
of 3.3 million people to 9,596 online display (banner) advertising campaigns. We then ex-
plored how privacy regulation in the form of the 2002/58/EC Privacy Directive inuenced
advertising eectiveness in the European Union.
The empirical analysis in the paper is straightforward because of the randomized nature
of the data collection. For each of the 9,596 campaigns there was an experiment-like setting,
with a treatment group that was exposed to the ads and a control group that was exposed
14to a public service ad. The data was collected by a large media metrics agency on behalf
of their clients to provide real-time benchmarking data for relative performance of dierent
advertising campaign creatives. To measure ad eectiveness, the media metrics agency
surveyed both those who were exposed to the ad and those who were not about their purchase
intent towards the advertised product. They did this by collecting responses to a short survey
that appeared in a pop-up window when the consumer left the webpage where the ad was
placed.
Generally this is an attractive way of measuring the eect of such laws. The way these
surveys were conducted was not changed by the laws. What we hypothesize changed was
the ability of the advertiser and the website to show advertising to relevant groups after the
regulation restricted their ability to use consumer data to target advertising. This should
be reected in a decrease in the lift in purchase intent for those exposed to the ad relative
to those who were not.
Following this intuition, we explored whether the dierence between exposed and control
groups is related to the incorporation of the Privacy Directive into various European coun-
tries' laws. The paper indeed nds that display advertising became 65 percent less eective
at changing stated purchase intent among those surveyed after the laws were enacted relative
to other countries.
We assert that this evidence suggests a causal relationship. The underlying assump-
tion is that there was no systematic change in advertising eectiveness independent of, and
coinciding with, the Privacy Directive. To explore this assumption, we exploit the fact
that sometimes people browse websites outside their country. As a practical matter, non-
European websites do not adjust their data-use practices for European citizens. Therefore
we observed the behavior of Europeans on non-European websites and the behavior of non-
Europeans on European websites. We found that Europeans experienced no reduction in
ad eectiveness coincident with time of the regulation when they browsed non-Europeans
15websites. Similarly, non-Europeans did experience a reduction in ad eectivness coincident
with time of the regulation when they browsed Europeans websites. This suggests that
the observed change around the time of the regulation is not due to changing attitudes of
European consumers. For example, it is not the case that Europeans simply became more
cosmopolitan in their attitudes towards advertising over the time period.
We also checked that there were no signicant changes in the types of ads shown in
Europe. For example, it is not the case that there were signicantly more video or rich
media ads in the US after the policy change. There was also no signicant change in the
demographics of the people responding to these pop-up surveys or in the types of products
advertised.
Crucially, the paper also nds that websites that had general content (such as news and
media services) that is unrelated to specic product categories experienced larger decreases
in ad eectiveness after the laws passed than websites that had more specic content (such
as travel or parenting websites). Customers at travel and parenting websites have already
identied themselves as being in a particular target market, so it is less important for those
websites to use data on previous browsing behavior to target their ads.
The E-Privacy Directive also disproportionately aected relatively small and plain ads
(rather than ads with striking visual content or interactive features). One interpretation
is that the eectiveness of a plain banner ad depends on whether it is appropriate and
interesting to the viewer. Advertisements that use video to interrupt the entire screen rely
less on such targeting. Therefore, the laws curtailing the use of past browsing behavior to
identify a target audience for the ads would aect plain banner ads disproportionately.
There are some obvious limitations to the study which should be noted. First, the kind
of ads that we examined were not mediated through ad networks. Advertising networks
tend to have large scope, so they may have been able to devote more resources to complying
with the regulation and consequently suered fewer ill eects. Second, the outcome that
16Figure 1: Ad Eectiveness Changes with Privacy Regulation
The values in this graph are derived from the regression analysis in Goldfarb and Tucker (2011c), Tables 5 and 9. Each bar
represents the estimated lift in purchase intention from seeing an ad{the dierence between purchase intention of the treatment
group and the control group in each time period.
we measure is stated purchase intent. It is likely that the group of people who answers
these web surveys may be dierent from the general population in ways we do not observe,
so we do not know if the regulation changed average behavior. What we do know is that
the regulation was associated with a large collapse in a metric commonly used to measure
advertising eectiveness. Figure 1 summarizes these results.
Together these ndings have important implications for how privacy regulation will aect
the direction of innovation on the advertising-supported internet. First, privacy protection
will likely limit the scope of the advertising-supported internet. However, it also crucially
suggests that the types of content and service provided on the internet may change. In
particular, without the ability to target, website publishers may nd it necessary to adjust
their content to be more easily monetizable. Rather than focusing on political news, they
may focus on travel or parenting news because the target demographic is more obvious.
Furthermore, without targeting it may be the case that publishers and advertisers switch to
17Figure 2: Ad Eectiveness Changes with Consumer Privacy Concerns
The values in this graph are derived from the regression analysis in Goldfarb and Tucker (2011b), Table 2. Each bar represents
the estimated lift in purchase intention from seeing an ad{the dierence between purchase intention of the treatment group and
the control group for each of the four types of ads. `Privacy focus' is dened as people who did not reveal their income in the
survey.
more intentionally disruptive, intrusive, and larger ads.
Consistent with the idea of substitution between disruptive and targeted ads, in Gold-
farb and Tucker (2011b) we showed that consumers react negatively to ads that are both
disruptive and targeted. Specically, while targeted ads are more eective than untargeted
ads and disruptive ads are more eective than non-disruptive ads, ads that are targeted
and disruptive tend to perform poorly. They provide evidence that the reason is related to
consumer privacy concerns. Specically, as shown in Figure 2, privacy-focused respondents
receive no lift in purchase intent from ads that were both targeted and disruptive (or `obtru-
sive'). This contrasts with other respondents who do experience a lift similar in magnitude
to untargeted obtrusive ads. The paper also shows that websites with content that might be
considered private have less lift from ads that are both targeted and obtrusive.
In addition to its implications for substitution between ad formats, this suggests that
18consumers accept targeting under some conditions but resist it under others. Therefore,
rather than simply providing an opt-out mechanism, an alternative approach to addressing
privacy concerns regarding advertising is to empower users to control what information is
used, and how.
Tucker (2011) further explores the role of user controls. She uses eld experiment data
to evaluate the eect of Facebook giving users increased control over their privacy settings
in the spring of 2010. She nds that after Facebook allowed users more transparent control
over their privacy settings, personalized advertising (specically mentioning specic details
about a user in the ad-copy) became more eective. Again, this suggests that regulation
does not need to be a simple binary choice as to whether to have privacy protection or
not. This provides empirical evidence supporting the idea of a two step approach to the
collection of data for online advertising proposed in Cavoukian (2011). Giving users control
over their privacy settings might still serve the purpose of privacy protection while reducing
the potential harm to the online advertising industry and the advertising-supported internet.
3.2 Health Services
3.2.1 Regulation
There has been a large push for health privacy rules to address patients' concerns about
the handling of sensitive medical information. The enactment of these laws reect growing
patient concerns about their medical privacy. Westin (2005) found that 69% of survey
respondents stated that they are `very concerned' or `somewhat concerned' that digital health
records may lead to \more sharing of your medical information without your knowledge" and
65% of respondents were concerned that digital health records would make it more likely that
others would not disclose sensitive but necessary information to doctors and other healthcare
providers because of worries that it would go into computerized records. In addition to
concerns over privacy, there are also concerns over the security of electronic health data.
19Miller and Tucker (2011b) provide some evidence that such concerns are warranted. They
nd that hospitals that have digital health records, and in particular hospitals that have
attempted to consolidate digital health information, are more likely to have a data breach
that attracts negative publicity.3
In the EU, personal data recorded in EMRs must be collected, held, and processed
in accordance with the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. Article (8) explicitly assigns
health information to a special category of data.4 For such data, the subject needs to give
explicit consent. There is, however, some leeway because there are some exceptions in certain
health-related situations where there is a guarantee of professional secrecy (as is common
for doctors).
In the US, the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) called
for some health privacy, but the eective compliance date for the resulting rule was only
April 2003.5 Although HIPAA provides a uniform minimum standard of federal privacy
protection for documenting how health information is used, actual standards about usage
continue to vary from state to state. For example, under HIPAA, consumers can request
medical records but a health provider can refuse to provide them as long as they provide
justication. Although HIPAA requires that entities maintain \reasonable and appropriate"
data safeguards, this standard is often weaker than state requirements. HIPAA is further
weakened by its dependence on consumer complaints to initiate actions. This has been
somewhat corrected with recent changes under the 2009 HITECH act.
As a result of this, much of the development in privacy law in the US has been led by the
states. Pritts et al. (2002), Pritts et al. (1999) and Gostin et al. (1996) provide a useful guide
3Regulation to prevent such data breaches is not straightforward. Miller and Tucker (2011b) nd that
commonly advocated policies such as encryption designed to ensure health data security are often ineective
because such policies not address the fact that medical insiders are often responsible for data loss either due
to negligence or criminal intent.
4Other special categories are data that reveals racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, or an individual's sex life.
5Sections 261 through 264.
20to the striking dierences in comprehensiveness and focus of these laws. Data provided by
Miller and Tucker (2011a) suggests that by 2006, over 73 percent of counties were in states
had some form of basic disclosure law.
3.2.2 Consequences
Although Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) were invented in the 1970s, by 2005 only 41
percent of US hospitals had adopted a basic EMR system. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
privacy protection may partially explain this slow pace of diusion. For example, expensive
state-mandated privacy lters may have played a role in the collapse of the Santa Barbara
County Care [Health] Data Exchange (SBCCDE) in 2007. Miller and Tucker (2009) examine
the empirical consequences of privacy regulation. In particular, they study how privacy
regulation suppresses network eects in adoption of medical information technology.
Network eects may shape the adoption of EMRs because hospitals derive network ben-
ets from EMRs when they can electronically exchange information about patient histories
with other health providers such as general practitioners. Exchanging EMRs is quicker and
more reliable than exchanging paper records by fax, mail, or patient delivery. It is especially
useful for patients with chronic conditions who want to see a new specialist who requires
access to previous tests. Emergency room patients whose records (containing information
about previous conditions and allergies) are stored elsewhere also benet.
Privacy protection may aect the network benet of EMRs to hospitals and, by impli-
cation, alter how much one healthcare provider's decision to adopt EMRs is aected by
another hospital's adoption. The direction of this eect is not clear. Privacy protection
could increase the network benets to healthcare providers of exchanging information elec-
tronically if it reassures patients who are then more likely to provide accurate information.
On the other hand, privacy regulation might decrease the network benet if it makes it more
complicated for healthcare providers to share data. The increased regulatory burden asso-
21Figure 3: Technology adoption can be suppressed by privacy regulation
The values in this graph are derived from the regression analysis in Miller and Tucker (2009), Table 2. Each bar represents the
predicted adoption likelihood for a hospital with average characteristics by whether it is located in a state with a privacy law
and the number of other local hospitals that have adopted an EMR.
ciated with information exchange may then eliminate what would otherwise be the relative
advantage of electronic records, the ability to transfer information quickly and cheaply.
Miller and Tucker (2009) pursue a three-pronged empirical approach to evaluate whether
privacy protection helps or hinders EMRs' diusion. Initially, they identify how network
eects shape the adoption of EMRs, and how these network eects vary by whether states
have privacy legislation or not. They then examine how privacy legislation aects overall
adoption. Last, they present evidence that suggests that privacy legislation primarily reduces
demand for EMRs via the suppression of network eects. Overall, their analysis suggests
that state privacy regulation restricting the release of health information reduces aggregate
EMR adoption by hospitals by more than 24%. This decrease is strongly driven by the
suppression of network externalities.
Figure 3 illustrates this dierence. The baseline adoption rate of EMRs is 17%. For states
22without privacy regulations, as the number of other local hospitals that have adopted EMR
rises, the likelihood that a given hospital will adopt increases rapidly, about 13 percentage
points for every ve hospitals. In contrast, for states with privacy regulations, as the number
of other local hospitals that have adopted rises, the likelihood that a given hospital will adopt
rises much more slowly, or about 7 percentage points for every ve hospitals. The paper
spends considerable eort demonstrating that these relationships are causal, from privacy
regulation to lower network eects.
Miller and Tucker (2011a) expand this analysis to look at how these dierences in EMR
adoption aect neo-natal outcomes. They nd evidence that looking at pure level eects,
without taking into account potential spillovers from network eects, state privacy protection
explains 5 percent of the variation in EMR adoption. The eects are strongest for those
patients who are most likely to benet from data sharing: those with pre-existing conditions
and for less educated, unmarried, and black mothers. Back-of-the envelope calculations
suggest that privacy protections are associated with 320 annual deaths of US-born babies
in the rst 28 days of life. This number must be interpreted cautiously, given the numerous
assumptions that go into it. Still, the results do suggest a causal negative impact of privacy
regulation on neonatal outcomes, particularly for disadvantaged groups.
3.3 Operational Eciency
3.3.1 Regulation
In general, the uses of customer data described for operational eciency has not tended
to attract as much privacy-related attention as other sectors. However, in some sense the
storage of this data represents a larger potential privacy risk to individuals than advertising
data.
First, data used to improve operations often has the explicit purpose of linking online
data to a real person and their actions. In contrast, most data stored for online advertising
23is attached to an anonymous prole through a particular IP address. It is far more dicult
for an external party to tie such data back to an specic individual user than the kind of
data used for product personalization discussed in this section.
Second, customer data for operational purposes tends to be stored for longer. In contrast,
the majority of online advertising data is stored for a short time. Indeed, the Interactive
Advertising Bureau suggested in 2010 that such data collection could be limited to a 48-hour
window.6 Though this met with some controversy, it is indicative of the extent to which data
for advertising is short-lived. Purchase decisions occur relatively quickly, so prior browsing
behavior quickly becomes irrelevant to predicting whether a customer will buy. One of
the risks of longer storage time frames is that they would make possible a fuller prole of
users' habits to emerge, which could more adversely aect usersa if used for surveillance or
malicious purposes.
The one area where such concerns have engendered separate scrutiny has been the policies
of search engines regarding their retention of clickstream data. Usually search engines collect
data for an individual user-prole using either a cookie or an IP address. Associated with
this prole are the search queries and subsequent clicks made by each user. The length of
time that data is retained is controversial. The EU parliament's privacy working party has
requested that search engines retain data for only six months. Currently Google anonymizes
IP addresses on its server logs after nine months, but keeps queries associated with a cookie
for 18 months. Microsoft has stated that it deletes them after six months at the EU's request.
This may change, however. In June 2010, the proposed `European Data Retention Directive'
would request search engines to keep data for 2 years in order to identify pedophiles and
other illegal activity better. This reects a reversion to the older debate about privacy and
data use for the prevention and detection of crime rather than data use for innovation.
6http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/10/04/iab_cookie_advice/
243.3.2 Consequences
There have been no empirical studies that we know of that attempt to quantify the costs of
regulation of using data to improve operations. A handful of theory papers have explored
the welfare consequences of data collection and the assignment of property rights over data.
These papers mostly focus on the use of data to facilitate price discrimination. For example,
Acquisti and Varian (2005) and Fudenburg and Villas-Boas (2006) examine how the use of
data to price discriminate aects consumers desire for privacy heterogeneously. Hermalin
and Katz (2006) show that assigning property rights over data may not achieve allocative
eciency if data is used for screening and price discrimination. However, given that the
data is used to improve operational eciency, it is likely that the results of Goldfarb and
Tucker (2011c) and Miller and Tucker (2011a) will hold: eciency will fall and the direction
of innovation will change, particularly in those areas where data use is most benecial.
4 Implications and Conclusion
4.1 Implications for Competitive Structure
In this paper, we have reviewed empirical work that has highlighted the tradeos between
regulation and innovation. However, privacy regulation may have consequences for two other
areas of commercial regulation: market structure and the openness of the internet.
Privacy regulation could aect how competitive markets are. Data-intensive operations
can lead to natural economies of scale and, on many occasions, network eects. A supercial
analysis might therefore assume that regulation designed to curb the use of data will decrease
tendencies towards monopolization of industries. However, Campbell et al. (2011) shows the
reverse may also be the case. Because privacy regulations typically require rms to persuade
their consumers to give consent, rms that have more to oer consumers nd it easier to
persuade consumers to give this consent. Therefore, though privacy regulation imposes costs
25on all types of rms, it is small rms and new rms who are disproportionately aected
because it is harder for them to obtain consent under the regulation.
While it is important not to draw rm conclusions from a single case example, this is
consistent with the experience of New Zealand with respect to their strict regulations on
credit reporting. The issuance of credit cards is more concentrated in the hands of a few
banks than in other similar countries, perhaps because small rms simply cannot obtain the
permissions necessary to run eective credit checks on potential applicants.
The potential change in competitive structure is related to another potential consequence
of privacy regulation: its role in facilitating or reducing an open internet. Specically, privacy
regulations may either facilitate or reduce the prevalance of `walled gardens' on the internet.
In the late 1990s, the objective of many internet providers (including, most prominently,
AOL) was to keep users within their network or walled garden. Within the network, users
could be condent that the websites visited were safe in terms of both computer security and
reliability of content. Currently, Facebook provides something like a walled garden, as does
Apple through its encouragement of `apps' rather than free surng. The potential impact
of new privacy regulation on the importance of such walled gardens depends on specics.
Kelley et al. (2010) argue that, in the absence of standardized language, consumers have a
dicult time understanding privacy notices. This could give large rms an advantage over
small rms in terms of consumer trust, leading users to spend an increasing portion of their
online activity within the walled garden environments provided by large rms. Regulation
that promotes standardized privacy notices might reverse this trend.
In contrast, to the extent that privacy regulation generates transaction costs (as modeled
by Campbell et al. (2011)), regulations will increase the importance of walled gardens. For
example, Facebook is considered a valuable service to many of its customers, so it is likely
that consumers would explicitly consent to give Facebook access to their data. This contrasts
with an unknown entrant that has not yet proven that it has value. Websites that take this
26walled garden approach control all data and encourage users to expand their internet usage
within the connes of the website. As such, privacy protection may stie innovation outside
of the structures developed by a handful of leading players.
Assessing the potential (anti-)competitive impact of regulation is already a well-developed
expertise of policy agencies in the United States and abroad. It is not clear, however, whether
this expertise has been focused on the consequences of privacy regulation. Similarly, there
is considerable expertise that analyzes the drivers of net neutrality and the open internet.
Again, using that expertise to focus on the potential impact of privacy regulation on these
other technology policy goals will enhance overall innovation policy.
4.2 Conclusion
Digitization has changed the regulatory environment for innovation (Greenstein et al., 2010)
in many ways, including copyright, trademarks, software patents, and trade policy. In this
chapter, we argue that digitization has meant that privacy has also become a key concern
for innovation policy.
Currently, there are two strikingly dierent approaches to privacy regulation. Some
countries, led by the EU, have focused on establishing general principles that govern use
of data across multiple sectors. These include the need for consumer consent upon data
collection and processing. By contrast, the US has taken a far more limited approach to
privacy regulation and consequently regulation has varied across industries and states, and
lagged behind industry practice. It is noticeable that these dierent approaches to privacy
policy, also echo the two dierent approaches to innovation policy. In the EU, there has
generally been an attempt to centralize and direct eorts, whereas again the US has taken
a more industry-specic or `as needed' approach.
The relationship between innovation and privacy policy runs deeper than this supercial
similarity suggests. This paper argues that ultimately privacy policy is interlinked with
27innovation policy and consequently has potential consequences for innovation and economic
growth. Drawing on empirical analysis of privacy regulations in online advertising and
healthcare, we summarize evidence that privacy regulations directly aect the usage and
ecacy of emerging technologies in these sectors. Furthermore, because these impacts are
heterogeneous across rms and products, regulations aect the direction of innovation.
This sets up a tension between the economic value created by the use of personal data, and
the need to safeguard consumers' privacy in the face of the use of such data. As discussed by
Hui and Png (2006), it is not straightforward to incorporate notions of privacy into economic
models, because such notions are often based around consumer emotions, as well as strict
economic concerns. As such, it is important for regulators to balance consumer uneasiness
with (or repugnance about) data collection and usage with the consequences such regulations
may have on certain types of innovation.
More broadly, the extent of privacy regulation should represent a tradeo between the
benets of data-based innovation and the harms caused by violations of consumer privacy.
Much of the policy discussion appears to assume substantial harms, perhaps citing survey
evidence that people do not like to be tracked (FTC, 2010). It is important to carefully
measure the size of these harms, ideally in a real-world revealed preference setting where the
costs and benets can be explicitly traded o. These studies should be conducted across
many industries and settings because such harms likely aect dierent sectors in dierent
ways. The fact there may be dierential eect both in terms of harm and incentives to
innovate across dierent sectors means that there may be potential adverse consequences
of using a single policy tool to regulate all sectors. These adverse consequences should be
set against the benets of simplicity and uniformity of comprehensive cross-sector privacy
regulation.
At the same time, it is important to note that the eects of policy are not uniform. While
policies that simply restrict the use of data appear to have a substantial negative impact on
28the scope of data-using industries, policies that enable choice and facilitate trust may have
a much more muted eect. Furthermore, these costs and benets vary substantially across
industries and contexts. The details of any privacy regulation matter a great deal in terms
of the potential impact on innovation.
This chapter highlights how digitization means that privacy policy is now integrally linked
to innovation policy. We have documented several ways in which rms use data to innovate
in online advertising, healthcare, and operations. We have also described empirical research
in online advertising and in healthcare that suggests that privacy policy has the potential to
change the direction of innovation. In many instances, privacy policy will therefore represent
a tradeo between data-driven innovation and the consumer harms from the collection and
use of digital information.
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